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INTERPRETING SECTION 4(f)(2) OF THE ADEA: DOES
ANYONE HAVE A "PLAN"?
BRUCE E. REINHARTt
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA" or "Act")1 to promote employment of older workers
2
and eliminate discrimination on the basis of age.' The drafters of the
Act recognized that some employee benefits are more expensive to pro-
vide to older workers and feared that requiring that all employees re-
ceive the same benefits would dissuade employers from hiring older
workers.4 To remedy this perceived problem, Congress included section
4(f)(2), making lawful any action taken in "observ[ance] of . . . any
bona fide employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or in-
surance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the
ADEA]." 5
Although the ADEA's legislative history makes clear that section
4(0(2) had the narrow purpose of permitting cost-justified reductions
in benefits for older workers, it provides no guidance in interpreting the
key terms of section 4(0(2). Instead, the interpretation of those terms
has been left to the judicial process. The courts, however, have lost
sight of the section's narrow scope and needlessly confuse its interpreta-
tion. The incorrect interpretation of section 4(0(2) creates problems for
both actual and potential litigants, distorts Congress's initial intentions
t B.S.E. 1984, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985 & West Supp. 1986)), as last amended by Act of
Apr. 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9201(b), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (100 Stat.) 82, 171; Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3342.
2 Employees within the protected age group of the ADEA are referred to as
"older workers."
3 See Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81 Stat. 602, 602 (1967) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982)). The Act originally protected workers between ages 40
and 65. The 1978 amendments extended coverage to workers between 40 and 70. See
Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 190 (1978) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982)). A 1986 amendment removed the upper age limit and ex-
tended ADEA protection to all workers over 40. See Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-592, § 2, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3342, 3342.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 28-37.
5 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982). As part of the 1978 amendments, Congress out-
lawed involuntary retirement of older workers. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92
Stat. 189, 189 (1978).
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in exempting certain benefit plans from ADEA coverage, and threatens
the traditional deference to collective bargaining agreements6 that has
been afforded by the courts.
7
The recent appellate decisions in EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp." ("Westinghouse I") and EEOC v. Borden's, Inc.9 announced a
test for whether an employee benefit plan is an "employee benefit plan,
such as a retirement, pensioR, or insurance plan" within the meaning
of section 4(0(2). This test has no basis in the legislative history, is
inconsistent with the language of the statute, and is needlessly restric-
tive. Other courts of appeals have refused to adopt it.1" A clearer statu-
tory test should minimize potential litigation and should result in the
application of the ADEA in a manner that comports more accurately
with the statute's legislative history. If the law is unambiguous and
easily applied, potential litigants can better assess their claims and may
settle disputes without resorting to legal action. This Comment criti-
cizes the Westinghouse I test and proposes an alternative that would
avoid its problems.
Westinghouse I and Borden's arose from the denial of benefits at
the time of plant closings. With plant closings becoming more preva-
lent, additional ADEA claims are likely. Such a claim can delay signifi-
cantly the final resolution of the plant closing. For example, Westing-
house Electric Corporation closed its Belleville, New Jersey, plant in
1977,11 but the age discrimination case was not resolved until 1984. No
party to a plant closing gains from such a delay. The older worker,
after losing a job due to the plant closing, may need the contested bene-
fits to minimize the disruption of her life. Even ultimate victory in an
age discrimination suit does not avoid this initial disruption. Similarly,
for unions, the uncertainty of litigation in this area creates doubts as to
6 This Comment considers only employment relationships involving collective bar-
gaining. It should be noted, however, that many employers also provide employee bene-
fits in the absence of collective bargaining.
7 See The Steelworkers Trilogy Cases (United Steelworkers of America v. Ameri-
can Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
8 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). This case is
designated Westinghouse I to distinguish it from EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
632 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("Westinghouse I1"). Westinghouse II also involves
purported age discrimination under the company's layoff income and benefit ("LIB")
plan.
9 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
10 See Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986); Britt v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985); Patterson v. Independent
School Dist., 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984); Parker v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n,
741 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1984).
11 See 725 F.2d at 214.
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whether their negotiated collective bargaining agreement will be given
full effect. Finally, the employer closing a plant prefers not to have
lingering problems-especially litigation. Often, the reason for the
plant closing is an unfavorable financial situation, and a financially
troubled employer may not be able to afford the costs of lengthy litiga-
tion. Therefore, all concerned parties would benefit from a clear inter-
pretation of the ADEA.
The Westinghouse I decision invalidated a term of the collective
bargaining agreement that had existed for over a decade. This result is
extreme and has severe consequences. A long-existing term in a collec-
tive agreement creates expectations on the part of both the employer
and the workers. In the case of an employee benefit, the employer must
anticipate the cost of the benefit in her financial planning. Similarly,
the employee knows the amount of benefit to be received and can plan
her finances accordingly. To invalidate a provision that limits the avail-
ability of a benefit creates a windfall for the employee and a large,
unexpected expense for the employer. It also fails to recognize that col-
lective bargaining involves trade-offs between different kinds of com-
pensation and benefits.1 2 In addition, the invalidation of a collectively
bargained provision by operation of law (i.e., the ADEA) distorts the
parties' agreement and circumvents the bargaining process: a party to
the agreement may agree to an unfavorable provision as a quid pro quo
for a favorable one and then, many years later, seek to use the ADEA
to abrogate the unfavorable provision."3
Part I of this Comment explores the structure of the ADEA and
identifies two parameters with which any interpretation of the terms of
section 4(0(2) must be consistent: (1) the ADEA prohibits only age-
based discrimination, and (2) section 4(f)(2) was intended by Congress
only to allow reduced benefits for older workers where the cost of the
benefit depends on the age of the employee. Part II focuses on inter-
preting the pertinent terms of section 4()(2). It first examines the legis-
lative history for any interpretive guidance, then looks to the adminis-
trative regulations and the case law. The case law analysis traces the
two ways in which employers claim their plans are "employee benefit
'" See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
,, A related issue that is beyond the scope of this Comment concerns steps an
employer can, and should, take if § 4(0(2) threatens to invalidate an existing collec-
tively bargained severance agreement. Although renegotiation seems to be the most ap-
propriate avenue, the realities of the situation may make renegotiation infeasible in the
plant closing situation. The union may be uncooperative both because it is angered by
the plant closing and because it could gain a! substantial windfall if the severance pay
plan is invalidated by operation of law and a court orders severance benefits for all
employees.
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plans, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plans." The first
claim is that the plan independently falls within the statutory phrase.
The Westinghouse I test applies to this kind of claim. The second pos-
sible claim is that the plan is part of a larger, integrated benefit struc-
ture that, in its entirety, satisfies the statute.14 This part also examines
several alternative interpretations of the terms of section 4(0(2) that
satisfy the requirement that the section only allow reduced benefits
where the cost of the benefit is related to the age of the employee.
Part III demonstrates the inconsistencies of the Westinghouse I test
and proposes an alternative that would avoid these problems. The pro-
posed test combines the definition of "employee benefit plan" from the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")' 5 with the defi-
nition of "subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA]" from the
ADEA regulations. Part IV briefly returns to the issue of integrated
benefit plans and proposes criteria for evaluating whether a plan is part
of an integrated scheme.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE ADEA
Section four of the ADEA contains the Act's prohibition against
age discrimination."6 Section 4(a) describes those employment practices
that are unlawfu 1 7 whereas section 4(f) specifically designates several
practices as lawful: 8
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such
'4 See EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 650 F. Supp. 1561 (W.D. Tenn.
1987); Brief for Appellant at 19-22, EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 632 F. Supp.
343 (E.D. Pa. 1986) 86-1226.
15 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1986), as
amended by Act of Apr. 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9201(b), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 82, 171; Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3342.
12 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). The language of § 4(a)-(c) was taken from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (1982) with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1982).
's See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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individual's age; or
3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to
comply with this chapter.
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under sub-
sections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the particular business,
or where the differentiation is based on reasonable fac-
tors other than age, or where such practices involve an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and com-
pliance with such section would cause such employer,
or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate
the laws of the country in which such workplace is
located;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system
or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retire-
ment, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that
no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure
to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the invol-
untary retirement of any individual specified by section
631(a) of this title because of the age of such individual;
or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual
for good cause.1 9
An examination of these sections and the interplay between them is
necessary before discussing the legislative history and the interpretation
that has been given to section 4(0(2).
As the language of sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2) makes clear, in
order to constitute a violation of the ADEA, the different treatment of
an older worker must be "because of" age.20 Consequently, a showing
2' This is the current version of § 4(f), which was amended in 1978, see Pub. L.
No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978), and in 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98-459,
§ 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1792, 1792 (1984).
20 See, e.g., Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co., 688 F.2d 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1982)
("[T]o establish a cause of action under the ADEA, a claimant must show that he was
discriminated against because of his age.").
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that the allegedly discriminatory actions are not because of age is a
complete defense to any charge of violating the ADEA."1 In many situ-
ations, however, the motive for an action consists of both age and non-
age components. In these instances, the person alleging the violation
must show that age is the determining factor in the decision.22
Whereas section 4(a) makes discrimination because of age unlaw-
ful, section 4(f) denotes specific situations in which differential treat-
ment of older workers is lawful. An employer complies with section
4(f)(2) by spending the same amount on benefits for older workers as
for other employees, even if those equal expenditures do not provide
equal benefits." For example, because the cost of term life insurance
increases with the age of the person covered, a $1000 expenditure may
purchase $100,000 of coverage for a thirty-year-old employee, but only
$75,000 of coverage for a sixty-year-old employee. An employer spend-
ing $1000 on each worker satisfies the ADEA, even though the older
worker receives less insurance coverage. In contrast, spending $900 for
the older worker and $1000 for the younger employee would not be
protected by section 4(f)(2). If this different expenditure were because
of age, it would violate the ADEA. 4
The remainder of this Comment focuses on section 4(f)(2), specifi-
cally the interpretation of the phrase "employee benefit plan, such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan." It is clear that section 4(f)(2) is
not intended to make lawful employee benefit plans that make unequal
expenditures for older workers. Nevertheless, it is unclear which inter-
pretation of its terms best achieves this result.
21 See Britt v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a voluntary reduction in force plan does not constitute discrimination
because of age); Parcinski v. Outlet Co., 673 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1103 (1983) (no age discrimination occurred where defendant eliminated a
department without regard to employees' ages).
22 See, e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d
Cir. 1984) (Plaintiff "need not prove that age was the employer's sole or exclusive
consideration, but must prove that 'age made the difference' in that decision." (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1035
(2d Cir. 1980) ("Where an employer acts out of mixed motives. . . the plaintiff must
show that age was a causative or determining factor . . ... "), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981).
" See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Interpretations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 860.120(a)(1) (1986) (A benefit plan satisfies § 4(0(2) if "the actual amount of pay-
ment made or cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that [for] a
younger worker, even though the older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of
benefit or insurance coverage.").
' It should, however, be noted that being outside § 4(0(2) does not settle the
question of violating the ADEA. Section 4(0(1) might protect the different expenditure
or it may be interpreted not to violate § 4(a).
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II. INTERPRETING SECTION 4(0(2)
A. Legislative History
The first step in properly interpreting the terms of section 4(0(2)
is to examine the legislative history of the provision.2 5 The following
discussion details all of the Senate hearings pertinent to section 4(0(2).
Because they occurred before the House hearings 6 and because section
4(0(2) in its final form was reported by the Senate subcommittee,
only the Senate hearings are discussed.
None of the original age discrimination bills contained an excep-
tion for actions taken under employee benefit plans.28 Senator Javits
expressed the need for an exception on the first day of the Senate hear-
ings on the proposed legislation.29 Senator Javits noted that the benefits
payable to employees under some pension plans are "based to a certain
extent on the age of the employee when first hired.""0 Requiring em-
ployers with these kinds of plans to provide equal pension benefits to
older workers might discourage their employment because such benefits
cost more for older than younger workers.31 Therefore, Senator Javits
proposed that the bill give employers flexibility to structure the benefits
under their pension plans to reflect the higher cost of providing benefits
' See N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONsTRuCTION § 48.03 (4th ed.
1984).
26 The Senate held hearings March 15-17, 1967; the House held hearings August
1-17, 1967.
27 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
21 Compare S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in Age Discrimination
in Employment, 1967: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 6-7 [herein-
after Senate Hearings] (§ 4(0(2) not present) with Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1982 & Supp. 1111985)). The bill
eventually enacted with amendments was S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The
House considered the identical bill as H.R. 4221, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Section
4(0(2) of these bills permitted "an employer, employment agency or labor organization
...to separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or system where
such policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act."
Senate Hearings, supra, at 6-7; Age Discrimination in Employment, 1967: Hearings
on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967) [hereinafter
House Hearings].
29 See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 24 (prepared statement of Sen. Javits);
see also id. at 27 (testimony of Sen. Javits).
30 Id. at 24 (prepared statement). This statement suggests that Senator Javits was
concerned with actions taken under defined benefit pension plans. Under defined bene-
fit pension plans it is more expensive to provide the same level of benefits for older
workers. Nevertheless, a large body of retirement plans-defined contribution
plans-do not have such an age-related cost relationship. These issues are discussed
more fully infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
31 See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 24 (prepared statement).
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to older workers, thereby removing any inherent disincentive to em-
ploying older workers. 2
Immediately following Senator Javits, Senator Smathers, a sponsor
of Senate Bill 830,"8 one of the age discrimination bills, addressed the
subcommittee and advocated an exception for employee benefit plans."
He noted that the bill before the committee might be interpreted to
require that workers hired between the ages of forty-five and sixty-
five35 receive "private pension rights and other fringe benefits" identical
to those provided to younger workers, thus ignoring the fact that bene-
fits for older workers are more expensive." To avoid this possible prob-
lem, Senator Smathers proposed the following amendment to Senate
Bill 830:
(g) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to make unlawful
the varying of coverage under any pension, retirement, or in-
surance plan or any plan for providing medical or hospital
benefits for work injuries, where such variance is necessary
to prevent the employer's being required to pay more for
coverage of an employee than would be required to provide
like coverage for his other employees.
37
Although the Smathers amendment was not adopted as part of the
ADEA, it was the first mention that an employee benefit provision
might cover programs other than pension or retirement plans.
As part of the same hearings, the subcommittee received a pre-
pared statement from a leading employee benefit consulting firm8 sug-
gesting a broadening of unamended section 4(f)(2). This statement rec-
ommended that retired employees within the ages covered by the
ADEA not be required to receive identical "employee benefits, such as
group life insurance, medical benefits, etc." as still-employed workers
of the same age.3 9 It proposed that in addition to the bill's exception for
32 See id. (prepared statement).
33 See supra note 28.
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 29-30 (testimony of Sen. Smathers).
35 Senate Bill 830 protected workers between these ages. Id. at 15-16. As finally
enacted, the bill protected workers between 40 and 65. See supra note 3.
38 See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 29-30 (testimony of Sen. Smathers).
37 Id. at 30.
38 See id. at 279-80 (prepared statement of Charles S. Manning, Executive Vice
President, Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.). The identical statement was
presented to the House subcommittee. See House Hearings, supra note 28, at 496-97.
39 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 279. Many employers continue benefits for
retired workers, often at reduced levels. See THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS:
DESIGN, FUNDING AND ADMINISTRATION 64 (J. Rosenbloom, ed. 1984) [hereinafter
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS] (continuation of life insurance); J. ROSENBLOOM & G. HALL-
MAN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANNING 208-12 (1981) (continuation of health benefits).
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mandatory retirement under a bona fide retirement or pension plan, it
be amended to exclude its application "to the operation of the terms or
conditions of any other bona fide employee benefit plan."'40 Because the
phrase "bona fide employee benefit plan" is part of section 4(0(2) as
enacted, it is important to note its use here to describe fringe benefit
programs including, but not limited to, retirement or pension plans.
RepresentAtives of the insurance industry were next to address the
subcommittee."1 They feared that the proposed legislation went "be-
yond matters related to hiring and discharging of older workers"4 and
threatened traditional underwriting practice and the stability of costs
for benefits.' The industry's representatives noted the broad use of
age-related cost factors in the funding of benefit programs and the de-
termination of benefit levels, and they proposed "that the legislation be
amended to make clear that it would not affect the establishment or
operation of the terms or conditions of any bona fide retirement, pen-
sion, employee benefit or insurance plan." 4 This language indicates
they also believed that "employee benefit plans" encompassed more
than retirement, insurance, or pension plans.
The final testimony on section 4(0(2) came from the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company,45 which feared that its formula
for pension eligibility would violate the ADEA. Eligibility depended on
the employee having worked a minimum number of years and having
The concern addressed by the proposed amendment arises if a plan permits normal
retirement before the maximum age covered by the ADEA. For example, assume a
retirement plan allows normal retirement at age 62 and further permits a retiree to
continue to receive benefits at a reduced level. Without the proposed amendment, a 63-
year-old retiree might have to receive the same benefits as a 63-year-old who is still
working, thereby greatly increasing the cost for retiree's the benefits. The regulations
for § 4(0(2) resolve this issue by making lawful the reduction or cessation of life and
health insurance for retirees. See Age Discrimination in Employment Interpretations,
29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(i), (ii)(C) (1986). Presumably these regulations would, by
analogy, permit cessation of other insurance coverages. This situation of having active
workers and retirees who are the same age should become more common now that the
ADEA has no maximum age.
40 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 280.
41 Id. at 295-97 (joint prepared statement of the American Life Convention, the
Health Insurance Association of America, and the Life Insurance Association of
America).
42 Id. at 296. The same organizations presented to the House subcommittee a
statement virtually identical to that given to the Senate subcommittee. Compare House
Hearings, supra note 28, at 498-500, with Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 295-97.
The most significant difference was that the amendment proposed to the House mir-
rored the language that had been adopted by the Senate committee. See House Hear-
ings, supra note 28, at 499. This language became the final version of § 4(0(2).
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 296.
44 Id.
4' See id. at 315-17 (prepared statement of American Telephone & Telegraph
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attained a given age.46 The employer doubted whether the unamended
bill would invalidate this formula 47 but proposed amending section
4(0(2) to eliminate any doubt. Under the proposed amendment, actions
would be lawful if done in observance of "the terms and conditions of a
retirement policy or system where such policy is not merely a subter-
fuge to evade the purpose of this Act or to provide varying insurance
coverage according to an employee's age.
''
41
Those who addressed the subcommittee, including sponsors of both
bills under consideration, therefore, appeared to believe that any em-
ployee benefit exception should cover plans other than pension, retire-
ment, and insurance plans. The bill reported by the Senate subcommit-
tee contained section 4(0(2) in its final form. 49 The bills introduced for
debate in both the Senate and House contained the final language.5 0
The Committee Report5" explained that section 4(0(2) "serves to em-
phasize the primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older workers-by
permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in
employee benefit plans. The specific exception . . . is considered vita
[sic] to the legislation . ... 52 It further stated that the purpose of the
ADEA was to "promote the employment of older workers based on
their ability."5 Despite these direct statements of the purposes of the
ADEA and section 4(f)(2), neither the legislative history nor floor de-
bates indicate Congress's intended interpretation of the terms of section
46 See id. at 316. For example, any employee could retire if she had 15 years of
service and were 65 years old.
47 See id. at 317.
48 Id. This language was taken from the New York state law barring age discrim-
ination, and the reader is referred to the current N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(3-a)(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1982). The same statement was presented to the House committee, but the
proposed amendment was changed to conform with § 4(0(2) as passed by the Senate
subcommittee. See House Hearings, supra note 28, at 494-96.
"' See House Hearings, supra note 28, at 499 (joint prepared statement of the
American Life Convention, the Health Insurance Association of America, and the Life
Insurance Association of America proposing an amendment identical to § 4(0(2) in its
final form) ("We understand that such an amendment to companion bill, S.830, has
been approved by the Labor Subcommittee of the Senate.").
0 See 113 CONG. REC. 34,739, 34,754 (1967).
5' The bill finally enacted as the ADEA was the Senate bill, after the Senate had
adopted the language of the House bill. See 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2213, 2213. Therefore, only the House report was published.
52 H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2213, 2217; see also 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967)
(including statements by Sen. Javits and Sen. Yarborough clarifying the purpose and
scope of § 4(0(2)).
11 H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2214. The same language appears in 29 U.S.C.
§ 621(b) (1982). The ADEA is age-neutral; it also prohibits discrimination in favor of
older workers. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
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4(0(2), including what kinds of benefit schemes are "bona fide em-
ployee benefit plans, such as retirement, pension, or insurance plans."
B. Administrative and Judicial Interpretations
1. Administrative Interpretations
Any interpretation of the terms of section 4(f)(2) must be consis-
tent with two parameters inherent in the statute: (1) the ADEA pro-
hibits only discrimination on the basis of age" and (2) Congress in-
tended section 4(f)(2) to permit reduced benefits for older workers
where the cost of providing the benefits is tied to the employee's age.55
There are several possible ways of interpreting the terms of section
4(f)(2) that would achieve the overall result intended by Congress: a
plan providing lesser benefits to older workers, but lacking an inherent
age/cost relationship, could be designated as not "bona fide,"5 or not
an "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, 17 or as a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of" the ADEA 8
Any of these classifications would deny the plan protection under sec-
tion 4(f)(2).59 Because of the lack of guidance in the legislative history,
the courts and administrative agencies reasonably could have selected
any of these possibilities without reaching results contrary to Congress's
intent. The remainder of this section examines how these bodies have
interpreted the "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension,
or insurance plan" and "subterfuge" clauses of section 4(f)(2).
The pertinent regulations-similar to the legislative his-
tory-provide little guidance in interpreting the phrase "employee ben-
efit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan." They do,
however, provide an objective test for "subterfuge to evade the purposes
of [the Act]." 60 The regulations, noting that the purpose of section
See supra notes 20-22.
See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1986); supra notes 29-53 and accompanying
text.
" See EEOC v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 618 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
7 BEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. ("Westinghouse %"), 725 F.2d 211, 223 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
5 EEOC v. Home Ins., 672 F.2d 252 (1982).
" Any combination of these interpretations would also achieve the desired result.
'1 The original Act gave the Secretary of Labor responsibility for administration.
Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967). These duties were transferred to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1979. See Reorg. Plan
No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155 (1982), and
in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978), enacted pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C.
§ 901-912 (1982). The original ADEA regulations were issued by the Department of
Labor on June 21, 1968, see 33 Fed. Reg. 9172 (1968). A proposed interpretive bulle-
tin for new regulations was issued in 1978, see 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264-70 (1978). The
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4(0(2) was to permit cost-justified reductions in benefits for workers of
different ages, give the example that paid vacations and uninsured paid
sick leave programs are not covered by section 4(0(2) because "reduc-
tions in these benefits would not be justified by significant cost consid-
erations." 1 According to the regulations, therefore, it would violate the
ADEA for an employer to provide differing numbers of paid vacation
or sick leave days to employees of different ages solely on the basis of
age. 2 The regulations do not explicitly state whether such programs
fall outside section 4(0(2) because they are not "employee benefit
plans, such as retirement, pension, or insurance plans" or because they
are "subterfuge[s] to evade the purposes of [the Act]." Closer examina-
tion reveals that the regulations implicitly label them as subterfuges."3
The majority of the regulations explain the ways of determining if
a plan is a "subterfuge," including the appropriate means for showing
a cost justification for any reduction in benefit levels." "In general, a
plan . . . which prescribes lower benefits for older employees on ac-
count of age is not a 'subterfuge' within the meaning of section 4(f)(2),
provided that the lower level of benefits is justified by age related cost
considerations." 5 This statement compels the logical conclusion that
any plan with lesser benefits for older workers not justified by age-
related costs, such as a sick leave or paid vacation plan, is necessarily a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA.66 The regulations de-
final interpretive bulletin along with the current regulations was promulgated May 25,
1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648-62 (1979) (regulations codified at 29 G.F.R. 860
(1986)). The EEOC took over administration of the ADEA on July 1, 1979. The
current regulations took effect before the transfer occurred. See King, The ADEA and
Employee Benefit Plans-Part II, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19, 20 (1984). When the EEOC
issued new regulations, it specifically left the employee benefit section undisturbed. See
29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1981).
61 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1986). ("The legislative history of this provision
indicates that its purpose is to permit age-based reductions in employee benefit plans
where such reductions are justified by significant cost considerations.").
82 Employees may receive different vacation allotments based on other factors,
such as years of service. For example, a 42-year-old employee with 20 years of service
may lawfully receive more vacation than a 62-year-old employee with 5 years of
service.
8" But see 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979) (The final interpretive bulletin issued with
the 1979 regulations suggests that these benefits would not be "employee benefit
plans.").
I" See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d) (1986).
85 Id.
If the cited statement is accepted as true, its contrapositive must also be true: if
the lower level of benefits provided by a plan or plan provision is not justified by age-
related cost considerations, the plan or plan provision is a "subterfuge." See, e.g., R.
ACKERMANN, MODERN DEDUCTIVE LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS TECHNIQUES
AND SIGNIFICANCE 20 (1970) (discussing assertions and negative assertions); J. VENN,
THE PRINCIPLES OF EMPIRICAL OR INDUCTIVE LOGIC 219-39 (1907) (discussing the
formation and deduction of sound propositions).
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fine "employee benefit plan" as "a plan, such as a retirement, pension,
or insurance plan, which provides employees with what are frequently
referred to as 'fringe benefits.' The term does not refer to wages or
salary in cash."867 Because the term "fringe benefit" is equally as am-
biguous as the term "employee benefit plan," this definition provides
little assistance in interpreting "employee benefit plan." In addition, by
defining "employee benefit plan" with reference to retirement, pension,
or insurance plans, the regulations render the statutory phrase "such as
a retirement, pension, or insurance plan" repetitious and purely de-
scriptive, in no way limiting the boundaries of section 4(0(2). Any plan
that is an "employee benefit plan" is also, therefore, by definition an
"employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan." Finally, the regulations give no guidance in deciding if a "plan"
is present.
2. Judicial Interpretations
The Fifth Circuit had the first opportunity to interpret the lan-
guage "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insur-
ance plan." In Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,"8 the employer
mandatorily retired an employee pursuant to the company's "Profit
Sharing Retirement Plan." 9 The Secretary of Labor brought suit
claiming that because the retirement plan's costs were independent of
the ages of the covered employees, it was not the kind of plan Congress
intended to bring under section 4(f)(2). The Fifth Circuit held that the
This discussion of the subterfuge language ignores the regulations' use of the term
"in general," which suggests that there may be some situations in which a benefit plan
providing reduced benefits to older workers for a reason other than age-related costs
would not be a subterfuge. Careful analysis, however, demonstrates that providing re-
duced benefits under a plan without age-related costs must always be classified as a
subterfuge and that the regulations' use of the term "in general" is incorrect. The
statutory language speaks of a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]." The
purpose of the ADEA was to prohibit age-motivated discrimination in employment.
Therefore, reduced benefits for older workers are a subterfuge only if they result from
age-based discrimination. Examined independently from the purpose of § 4(f)(2), any
plan with a non-age-related reason for reducing benefits apparently would not be a
subterfuge. The subterfuge language must be read in the context of the purpose of
§ 4(f)(2), which was to permit reductions only if justified by age-related costs. See N.
SINGER, supra note 25, § 47.28. In this context, the permissible non-age reasons for
reduced benefits are limited: although a non-age reason may exist, reduced benefits
under the plan are a subterfuge unless that reason is an age-related cost factor.
67 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1986).
68 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
69 Id. at 214. Under the plan, 10% of the company's annual profits were paid to
the retirement fund trustee, "who distribute[d] these funds to plan members upon their
retirement." Id. Because the sole determinant of the employer's cost was the amount of
corporate profits, there was no age-related cost.
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profit-sharing retirement plan was an "employee benefit plan, such as
a retirement, pension, or insurance plan" but offered no criteria for this
classification." The court determined that in interpreting the statute,
"[tihe key phrase is 'employee benefit plan'. The words, 'retirement,
pension, or insurance', are added in a clearly descriptive sense, not ex-
cluding other kinds of employee benefit plans if, conceivably, there
could be any.","7 It refused to adopt the age-related cost test advocated
by the Secretary of Labor, finding that, because the statutory language
was unambiguous, there was no need to consider Congress's intent. 2
Brennan raised several issues that have remained unsettled in the later
cases involving section 4(f)(2): Is the language of the section unambigu-
ous or should courts look to the legislative history of the ADEA for its
interpretation? If they do, does the legislative history give any guid-
ance? Is the phrase "such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan"
merely descriptive, or does it limit the kinds of plans covered by section
4(0(2)?
The next case interpreting "employee benefit plan, such as a re-
tirement, pension, or insurance plan," Alford v. City of Lubbock,"' also
arose in the Fifth Circuit and gave that court the opportunity to ex-
plore further the issues raised in Brennan. Alford was the first federal
appellate court decision holding that a plan was not an "employee ben-
efit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan." The plain-
tiffs were two workers denied reimbursement for accumulated sick
70 See id. at 215-16. The court then held that tecause the plan had begun prior to
the enactment of the ADEA, it could not be a subterfuge. Id. at 215. This interpreta-
tion has been referred to as the "chronological" approach. Congress rejected this inter-
pretation of "subterfuge" in the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. See generally Note,
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Pension Plan Exception After
McMann and the 1978 Amendments, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 323, 326-28 (1978)
(discussing the "chronological" approach to interpreting "subterfuge").
71 500 F.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 216 ("[Ihf Congress meant terms in a statute to have other than their
ordinarily accepted meaning, 'it would and should have given them a special meaning
by definition.' ") (quoting NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325
(1951)).
In adopting this interpretation, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963). The Braunstein Court
"thought it improper to consider Congressional purpose when the meaning of a statute
is plain. And, the Court pointed to the practical difficulty of deciding, on a case by case
basis, whether a given course of conduct is within the Congressional purpose." 500
F.2d at 217. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit found that the language of a statute should
be interpreted to indicate clearly the scope of the unlawful behavior being regulated.
When the language is unambiguous, it would "hardly [be] reasonable to require per-
sons affected by legislation to delve into voluminous and conflicting collections of
speeches to determine whether what a statute plainly says is what it really means." Id.
73 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
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leave when they retired.74 Their suit alleged, inter alia, that the em-
ployer's refusal to pay for the accumulated sick leave violated the
ADEA.78 The defendant asserted that because the sick pay program
was part of its overall employee benefit plan, the refusal to pay was
protected by section 4(f)(2).7 6 The Fifth Circuit first clarified its find-
ing in Brennan that the statutory phrase "such as a retirement, pen-
sion, or insurance plan" did not exclude "'other kinds of employee
benefit plans if, conceivably, there could be any.' "7 It said that this
statement "did not suggest that [section] 4(0(2),exempt[edl all fringe
benefits from scrutiny under the Act";78 rather, the Alford court noted
that Congress added section 4(0(2) to protect complex benefit plans
from scrutiny under the ADEA.7 ' Applying this standard to the sick
pay program in Alford, the court held that the sick pay program was
"a simple fringe benefit" not excepted by section 4(0(2)80 but gave no
objective criteria for distinguishing "complex" plans from "simple"
ones.
Alford introduced the idea that an individual benefit program
might receive different treatment under section 4(0(2) if it were consid-
ered as part of a larger, integrated benefit scheme. The court "d[id] not
believe that Congress, in developing the ADEA exemption for em-
ployee benefit plans, . . . meant to countenance the discriminatory dis-
74 Id. at 1265. Retiring employees hired before age 50 were paid for up to 90
days of accumulated sick leave. See Alford v. City of Lubbock, 484 F. Supp. 1001, 1004
(N.D. Tex. 1979), affid in part and rev'd in part, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982). Employees, such as the plaintiffs, hired after reaching
age 50 received no payment for accumulated sick leave when they retired. Id. In addi-
tion, neither plaintiff received pension benefits because employees hired after age 50
were ineligible for pensions under the pension plan. Id. at 1003.
75 484 F. Supp. at 1004. The plaintiffs asserted that the denial of pension benefits
violated the ADEA and was not protected by § 4(0(2) because the pension plan was
not bona fide and was a subterfuge. Id. at 1005. Both the district court, 484 F. Supp at
1005, and the Fifth Circuit, 664 F.2d at 1271, rejected these claims. The plaintiffs also
asserted state and federal constitutional claims that were rejected. See 664 F.2d at
1266-67.
76 664 F.2d at 1271-72.
77 Id. at 1272 (quoting Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th
Cir. 1986)); see supra text accompanying note 71.
7s 664 F.2d at 1272 n.10.
7s See id. at 1272 ("Congress devised section 4(0(2) in order to postpone any
disruptive effects upon the many complicated pension plans already in force at that
time until it could tackle the issue in more considered and comprehensive legislation.").
s0 Id. The Fifth Circuit refused to consider the sick pay program part of an inte-
grated benefit plan because it was "not contained in the [pension plan] and [was] func-
tionally irrelevant to any 'retirement, pension or insurance plan.'" Id. The sick pay
program's only connection with the pension plan was the coincidence that both denied
benefits to employees hired after age 50. See id. In a footnote, the court stated that the
profit sharing retirement plan in Brennan was a "complex retirement package pro-
tected by the Act." Id. at 1272 n.10.
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pensation of all fringe benefits whether or not they are part of a spe-
cific and established 'benefit plan.' , This language suggested that,
even though a fringe benefit program did not by itself fall under section
4(0(2) (what here will be called, "independently protected"), it might
be protected if it were considered as part of an integrated benefit
scheme."2 In clarifying Brennan, the Fifth Circuit relied on Congress's
intent, seemingly rejecting Brennan's finding that no resort to the legis-
lative history was necessary. Nowhere in Alford does the Fifth Circuit
require that a program have an age-related cost factor to qualify as an
"employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan." The court's silence on this issue suggests that it continued to
adhere to Brennan's rejection of this idea. 3 Under Alford, whether a
fringe benefit program independently was protected by 4(0(2) de-
pended entirely on its complexity or simplicity.
The Third Circuit faced these issues a year later in EEOC v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp." ("Westinghouse "). The Westinghouse
Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse") denied layoff income and bene-
fits ("LIB") to retirement eligible employees when it closed its Belle-
ville, New Jersey, plant in 1977.85 The applicable collective bargaining
agreement required the company to offer LIB to "eligible employees"
affected by a layoff or plant closing at any of its plants nationwide.
These employees had the option to receive LIB payments as a lump
sum payment or as weekly payments."8 Retirement-eligible employees
Si Id. at 1272 (emphasis added).
82 See id. at 1272.
'3 See supra text accompanying note 72.
725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
85 Id. at 213. Westinghouse denied LIB payments to 65 employees who were
older than 55 and who had more than 10 years of service, and "summarily placed these
employees on early retirement." See id. The company based these actions on its inter-
pretation of the contractual term, "eligible employee." See id at 215; see also EEOC v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1042 (D.N.J. 1982), rev'd, 725 F.2d
211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
81 715 F.2d at 214-15. Selecting the lump sum option required the employee to
surrender all rights based on past service, except vested pension rights. See id. at 214.
The weekly payments supplemented the employee's unemployment compensation pay-
ments and did not require her to surrender any recall or service rights. Id.
The maximum amount of LIB that an employee received was the total maximum
sum, which was "equal to [one] week's pay for each full year of. . . service with the
company" but was never less than four week's pay. 577 F. Supp. at 1040. An employee
selecting the lump option received the entire total maximum sum in one payment. Id.
Under the weekly payment option, the employee received LIB payments to supplement
unemployment compensation. LIB was paid in an amount so that the aggregate of LIB
and unemployment compensation payments were 60% of the employee's weekly pay.
LIB continued until either the total maximum sum was expended or 12 months had
passed since the layoff. Id. at 1040-41.
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did not qualify as "eligible employees" for LIB.87
The EEOC filed suit on behalf of the retirement-eligible employ-
ees claiming that Westinghouse willfully violated section 4(a) of the
ADEA by denying them LIB payments on the basis of their age."
Westinghouse's defenses included a claim that its actions were lawful
under section 4(f)(2).89 The district court granted summary judgment
for Westinghouse on all the issues, including the 4(0(2) defense. The
district court also found that the LIB was part of Westinghouse's over-
all employee benefit scheme." The Third Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case on all counts. This court of appeals, relying on con-
gressional intent, interpreted the phrase "such as a retirement, pension,
or insurance plan" as limiting the scope of section 4(0(2). Because it
lacked any relationship between the age-of the covered employee and
the cost of the benefits provided, " the LIB program, considered inde-
pendently, was not an "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan." 2 Despite citing Brennan in noting that it
was "aware that the words 'such as retirement, pension, or insurance'
were added in a descriptive sense, not excluding other kinds of employ-
ment benefit plans," ' the court nevertheless concluded, "Even though
these words are descriptive, their description contains substance. These
words are to be interpreted as indicative of the types of plans in which
Congress intended to allow age distinctions; they are of the type
87 725 F.2d at 214. In order to qualify as an "eligible employee," a worker needed
two or more years of service and could not be "entitled to early retirement as specified
in the Westinghouse Pension Plan." 725 F.2d at 214; see also 577 F. Supp. at 1037
(discussing full requirements of "eligible employee"). Both the pension plan and LIB
program were the result of collective bargaining and applied to all Westinghouse em-
ployees nationwide. See id. at 1034.
" 725 F.2d at 215. The employees sought both early retirement and LIB lump
sum payments, which they claimed were severance pay. 577 F. Supp. at 1040. The
district court said the LIB was "a benefit plan to supplement unemployment insur-
ance," not severance pay. Id. at 1039.
89 725 F.2d at 215. Westinghouse also claimed that the suit was barred by the
statute of limitations and that its actions were permissible under § 4(0(1) because they
were based on reasonable factors other than age. See id. at 215, 217, 222.
90 See 577 F. Supp. at 1041. The district court's finding is discussed more fully
infra note 161.
91 See 725 F.2d at 224. The court correctly found that the LIB benefits received
by an eligible employee did not depend on age but instead "[were] based solely on an
employee's length of service-at least two years-and the occurrence of a layoff." Id.
The court could "glean no age-related cost factor on the face of the LIB Plan which
justifie[d] Westinghouse's actions." Id. at 224-25.
92 Id. at 225 (The court likened the LIB plan to the sick leave plan in Alford,
noting that both were "functionally independent" from the respective pension plans to
which they were linked. As such, the plan would be individually subject to § 4(0(2)
scrutiny.).
93 Id. at 224 (citing Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th
Cir. 1974)).
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whereby the cost of benefits increases with age."94 This analysis di-
rectly conflicts with Brennan, Alford, and the district court decision in
Westinghouse I, all of which refused to interpret the "such as" clause
as a limitation.
In addition to rejecting the LIB program as an independently pro-
tected plan, the Third Circuit also refused to recognize it as part of
Westinghouse's integrated benefit scheme.95 It stressed that the LIB
program was "functionally independent" of the Westinghouse pension
plan: "The mere fact that the benefits available to employees under the
Pension Plan were to be considered when determining eligibility for
LIB. . . does not merge the two plans into a single 'coordinated bene-
fit plan.' "" This language suggests, however, that if the court had
found the LIB to be part of a single, integrated benefit plan, it would
have found it lawful under section 4(0(2). As in Alford, the court
reached its conclusion without giving any criteria for evaluating
whether a program was integrated.
For several reasons, the test announced in Westinghouse I rests on
questionable support. First, the Third Circuit introduced the idea that
the set of "employee benefit plans" covered by section 4(0(2) is limited
to those with an age-related cost factor. The basis for this interpretation
is unclear; no supporting authority is cited. Second, the court cites
Brennan for the proposition that the "such as" clause is descriptive
only, but the court immediately contradicts itself by finding that the
words limit the class of "employee benefit plans." Third, the court says
that retirement, insurance, and pension plans are the kinds of plans "in
which Congress intended to allow age distinctions"9 " but does not ex-
plain how it discerned Congress's intent. As was shown, the legislative
history lacks any indication of the intended interpretation of "employee
benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan."98
Rather, any discussion in the legislative history was of the scope of the
entire 4(0(2) provision. Finally, the Third Circuit said, "[T]he thread
common to retirement, insurance, and pension plans . . . is the age-
9Id.
95 See id. at 225 ("Fringe benefit plans unrelated to the age cost factor are not
included in the 4(0(2) exception."). But see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
By refusing to recognize the LIB program as part of Westinghouse's benefit plan,
the Third Circuit rejected a factual finding by the district court that the plans were
interlocked. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1041
(D.N.J. 1982), rev'd, 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
" 725 F.2d at 225 (citing EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (D.
Ariz. 1982), affid, 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 224.
See supra notes 28-53 and accompanying text.
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related cost factor." ' This statement is incorrect; many kinds of retire-
ment and insurance plans do not have age-related costs.100
Almost concurrently with the Third Circuit decision in Westing-
house I, the Ninth Circuit decided EEOC v. Borden's, Inc.,10 1 which
involved the denial of severance pay after a December 31, 1979, plant
closing in Phoenix, Arizona.102 The severance pay program, which ap-
plied only to the Phoenix plant, was adopted in November 1979 as an
addendum to the collective bargaining agreement that had been re-
newed in July 1979.103 It denied benefits to employees eligible for re-
tirement.10 4 The existing retirement plan was not reopened during the
negotiations over the severance pay policy.105 On behalf of fourteen em-
ployees denied severance pay, the EEOC filed suit under the ADEA.
As one of its defenses, Borden's, Inc. asserted that the severance pay
program fell under section 4(0(2) because it "was connected with the
existing retirement plan in such a way so as to create a 'coordinated
benefit plan.' "106 The district court rejected this claim 7 and the Ninth
" 725 F.2d at 224.
100 See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
101 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984). Westinghouse I was decided December 29,
1983; Borden's was decided January 31, 1984.
102 See id. at 1391.
203 Id. Identical severance pay provisions were added to collective bargaining
agreements with two unions: Teamsters and Operating Engineers. Both the Teamsters
and the Operating Engineers accepted the severance policy in November, 1979. See
EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 & nn.1-2 (D. Ariz. 1982), affld, 724
F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
104 724 F.2d at 1391-92. Under the pension plan employees could retire at age 55
with 10 years service. The severance pay agreement denied payments "to any employee
who at the time of termination is eligible for a normal or early retirement pension."
551 F. Supp. at 1097 n.2.
105 551 F. Supp. at 1099; see also 724 F.2d at 1396 ("There is no evidence that
the severance pay proposal caused the collective bargaining agreements to be renegoti-
ated or affected them in any other way."). It is unclear when the plant dosing was
announced.
106 551 F. Supp. at 1099; see also 724 F.2d at 1396 (The severance pay policy
was an "integral part of its retirement and pension package.").
'o' The district court relied on Alford in rejecting the employer's claim and noted
that the "mere fact" that the available level of retirement plan benefits was considered
in deciding on the severance pay formula did not merge the two plans. 551 F. Supp. at
1099-1100. But see Patterson v. Independent School Dist., 742 F.2d 465, 467 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1984) (questioning both the finding that the severance pay policy was independent
of the overall employee benefit scheme and the reliance on Alford for this finding). The
district court specifically declined to decide whether a severance pay policy such as
Borden's could ever be part of an "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pen-
sion, or insurance plan." 551 F. Supp. at 1100.
Because Borden's' pleadings only claimed that the severance pay policy was part of
its integrated benefit scheme, see 551 F. Supp. at 1099, the district court did not ad-
dress the specific issue of whether the severance pay was independently an "employee
benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan." Nevertheless, its hold-
ing that § 4(0(2) did not protect the severance pay plan implicitly answers that ques-
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Circuit affirmed.1"8
In finding that the phrase, "such as a retirement, pension, or in-
surance plan," was not intended to be a complete list of the plans cov-
ered by section 4(f)(2), the Ninth Circuit relied on the legislative his-
tory. 09 It found that Congress's intent in enacting section 4(f)(2) was
to "avoid disrupting pensions and other complex, on-going benefit
schemes."110 Noting that the severance pay policy had been negotiated
separately from the collective bargaining agreement, the court found it
not to be part of a complex ongoing scheme; rather, the severance pay
policy was a "'simple fringe benefit' outside the scope of [section
4(f)(2)]."'111 Although it was hardly a model of clarity in this regard,
Borden's thus was the first case to suggest objective criteria for evaluat-
ing an integrated benefit scheme: the ongoing nature of the benefit and
the negotiation of the benefit along with the general collective bargain-
ing agreement.
Although it denied protection to the severance pay plan, the Ninth
Circuit said, however, that a "severance pay policy which is an integral
part of a complex benefit scheme might be regarded differently."112 In
addition, although the issue was apparently not contested by Borden's,
Inc.,123 the court also found that the severance pay plan was not inde-
pendently protected by section 4(f)(2) because the cost of the severance
pay benefits was unrelated to the age of the workers and because it was
"ca one-time, ad hoc cash payment," not an ongoing plan.114
After Westinghouse I and Borden's, courts, in evaluating claims
that plans were independently protected, appeared to be in agreement
that the legislative history was the proper place to find guidance in
interpreting "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or
insurance plan." As was shown earlier, however, there was nothing in
the legislative history to clarify how the terms of section 4(0(2) were to
be interpreted.11 5 In addition, the courts' interpretations of the "such
as" clause were inconsistent: some courts treated this phrase as a limi-
tation on "employee benefit plan" and others treated it as merely de-
tion in the negative.
2O8 724 F.2d at 1396.
'L9 Id. at 1395 (phrase "suggests that Congress meant to exempt only certain ben-
efit schemes from the antidiscriminatory provisions of the Act").
110 Id. at 1396.
I"1 Id. at 1397.
112 Id. at 1396-97 (citing Westinghouse I, 725 F.2d at 224-25). This citation to
Westinghouse I suggests that the Ninth Circuit would have construed the LIB program
to be part of a complex, integrated benefit structure.
118 See supra note 107.
114 724 F.2d at 1396; see also supra note 107.
115 See supra notes 28-53 and accompanying text.
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scriptive. Most courts also had acknowledged that a benefit scheme
should be treated differently under section 4(0(2) depending on
whether it was considered independently or as part of an integrated
plan. They provided little guidance, however, in deciding whether a
plan is part of an integrated benefit scheme. In the next Part, this
Comment evaluates the age-related cost test proposed in Westinghouse I
as applied to plans claiming independent protection and suggests an
alternative test for deciding whether a plan is independently protected
by section 4(f)(2). Part IV addresses the integrated plan issues.
III. CRITICISM OF Westinghouse I AND Borden's AND SUGGESTION
OF AN ALTERNATIVE TEST
A. Criticism
Considerable confusion and disagreement over the proper interpre-
tation of section 4(0(2) followed EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.11 6 ("Westinghouse ") and EEOC v. Borden's, Inc.'" Section
4(0(2) in its entirety only encompasses independent plans that have
age-related costs. The Westinghouse I test admittedly limits that sec-
tion's coverage to these kinds of plans but creates problems and
inconsistencies.
After Alford v. City of Lubbock""' and Brennan v. Taft Broad-
casting Co., 1 "employee benefit plans" were a subset of all possible
fringe benefits.1 20 A program could exist, such as the sick pay plan in
Alford, which was a fringe benefit but not an "employee benefit plan"
as defined by section 4(f)(2). No further subdivision existed, however.
This result followed directly from the conclusion that the phrase "such
as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan" had no limiting force.
Under the Westinghouse I and Borden's interpretation, however, a
further subset exists to which section 4()(2) is limited in its applica-
tion. Consequently, a program can exist that is concededly an "em-
ployee benefit plan" as defined by the ADEA but that is not an "em-
ployee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan"
within the protection of section 4()(2). This interpretation of the "such
as" clause necessitates two tests: one for "employee benefit plan" and
one for "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insur-
116 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
117 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
118 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
119 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
120 The term fringe benefits refers to any nonsalary payments or in-kind services
from an employer to an employee.
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ance plan." Westinghouse I and Borden's are flawed decisions because
neither proposes a separate test for "employee benefit plan."
By excluding from section 4(0(2) several benefits that are retire-
ment or insurance plans, the age-related cost test creates an inconsis-
tency in interpreting that provision. At a minimum, the terms of the
statute bring pension, retirement, and insurance plans within the ambit
of section 4(0(2). Nevertheless, some retirement and insurance benefits
commonly provided to employees lack age-related cost funding factors
and therefore do not satisfy the Westinghouse I test despite clearly fall-
ing within section 4(f)(2)'s coverage. 21
There are two categories of retirement plans-defined benefit
plans and defined contribution plans122-but only defined benefit plans
have age-related costs."2" Under a defined benefit plan, an employee's
annual retirement benefit is calculated by applying a formula that usu-
ally factors in her salary and years of service. The plan pays a fixed
annual benefit calculated at the time of retirement. The older the em-
ployee when hired, the less time available for funds to accrue to pay the
promised benefit; therefore, it may be more expensive to hire older em-
ployees under a defined benefit plan. Most employees in the United
States covered by the private pension system participate in defined ben-
efit plans.12 The emphasis on age-related cost factors in the legislative
11" Any attempt to define an employee benefit plan by examining programs com-
monly considered "employee benefits" involves a degree of circular reasoning. Any non-
salary compensation or employer provided, in-kind service is open to a claim that it
should be considered an employee benefit. These could range from company provided
health insurance to free coffee for employees. This Comment assumes that certain pro-
grams are employee benefit plans based on the extent to which such benefits are pro-
vided pursuant to employment contracts (free coffee usually is not) and are by common
understanding employee benefits. If the amendments suggested during the Senate hear-
ings on the ADEA are indicative of what might constitute the "common understand-
ing," it is clear that more than just pension, retirement, and insurance plans are em-
ployee benefits. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34), (35) (1982); E. ALLEN, J. MELONE & J.
ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING: PENSIONS, PROFIT SHARING, AND OTHER DE-
FERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 57-64 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PENSION PLAN-
NING]; Note, Age Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans: Financial Dilemma for
the Older Worker, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 368, 385-87 (1981). Another way to categorize
employee benefit plans is according to who funds the plan. If the employer pays all the
costs, the plan is noncontributory, whereas if the employee assumes some or all of the
cost, the plan is contributory. See J. ROSENBLOOM & G. HALLMAN, supra note 39, at
431-34. This Comment considers only noncontributory plans, although its analysis may
apply to many contributory arrangements.
"" The employer relies on actuarial assumptions to estimate annual funding costs
and assumes the risk that the amount of money funded during the worker's career may
be insufficient to provide the promised retirement benefits. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS,
supra note 39, at 394-95.
114 See SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1985, S. REP.
No. 242, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1986) ("Most private plan participants (70 percent)
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history suggests that Congress was most concerned with defined benefit
plans when it enacted section 4(0(2).
The second category of retirement plans are defined contribution
plans.125 A variety of programs are defined contribution plans, includ-
ing profit sharing, savings, thrift, and individual retirement account
(IRA) plans. If these plans provide retirement benefits, they can be
classified as defined contribution retirement plans.12 The employee's
benefit depends solely on the growth of the invested funds; therefore,
defined contribution plans do not have age-related costs.' 27 Conse-
quently, a defined contribution retirement plan would not be within
section 4(0(2) under the Westinghouse I interpretation, despite the lan-
guage of the statute bringing retirement plans under that section. West-
inghouse I creates a similar anomaly for some insurance benefits. The
most commonly recognized employer-provided insurance programs are
health, disability, and life insurance. 28 The employer's cost for these
programs usually increases with the age of the covered employee.129
Nevertheless, employers often provide insurance coverages for which
age and cost are unrelated. These include prepaid legal services, and
insurance for accidental death and dismemberment, personal liability,
and loss or destruction of property.'30
The Westinghouse I approach creates confusion and inconsisten-
cies in evaluating whether certain retirement and insurance plans are
independently "employee benefit plans, such as retirement, pension,
and insurance plans." In addition, it fails to propose the separate test
for "employee benefit plan" that its interpretation of the "such as"
are covered under a defined-benefit pension plan.").
125 See PENSION PLANNING, supra note 122, at 64 ("[T]he defined contribution
plan has begun to take on a more significant role and this role is likely to become
greater in the years ahead."); id. at 267 n.1 ("Over 80 percent of all new plans estab-
lished since the passage of ERISA have been defined contribution in nature.").
128 See, e.g., Brennan, 500 F.2d at 212 (profit sharing retirement plan); EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 39, at 491 (thrift plan can be a defined contribution
retirement plan).
127 For a discussion of funding of defined contribution plans, see PENSION PLAN-
NING, supra note 122, at 86-89; EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 39, at 435;
Schneyer, Employee Benefit Plans At A Glance, 5 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 277, 281-82
(1978).
128 These are the insurance coverages specifically discussed in the regulations. See
29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(i)-(iii) (1986).
129 See id.
120 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 39, at 275-301 (Employers commonly
provide automobile insurance, homeowner's insurance, and prepaid legal services as
employee benefits.); Cohen, Section 4(0(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: Age Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 379,
411-13 (1980) (discussing employee benefits in the form of accidental death and dis-
memberment insurance). But cf Amendment to Interpretive Bulletin, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,650 (1979) (prepaid legal services plan is not an "employee benefit plan").
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clause necessitates. The next section proposes a test that produces re-
suits consistent with the purposes of the ADEA and section 4(0(2) but
avoids the problems of the Westinghouse I test.
B. Proposed Test
Rejecting Westinghouse I requires formulating a new test to deter-
mine whether an independent benefit scheme is an "employee benefit
plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan." The legislative
history lacks any direct indication of the types of plan this term encom-
passes and therefore gives no guidance for interpretation. Absent con-
gressional guidance, or indications that the phrase "employee benefit
plan" means something other than what it says, there is no basis for
adopting the limited meaning espoused in Westinghouse I and Bor-
den's. Broader interpretation of this phrase would not automatically
except all benefit plans from the ADEA, however, because of the regu-
lations' vigorous test for "subterfuge." ' The regulations' definition of
"subterfuge" independently invalidates those programs not eligible for
section 4(0(2) protection; thus, a narrow test for "employee benefit
plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan," such as the one
proposed in Westinghouse I, is unnecessary. No matter how broadly
one interprets "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or
insurance plan," only those plans with cost-justified reductions in bene-
fits survive the subterfuge test.
Consider, for example, a plan that has age-related costs and
reduces benefits for older workers by an amount greater than that justi-
fied by the increased cost. This program is of the kind intended to fall
outside of section 4(0(2). It is a subterfuge under the regulations and
properly is denied section 4(0(2) protection, regardless of the defini-
tion of "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or in-
surance plan." In contrast, a plan without age-related costs is a sub-
terfuge only if it reduces benefits for older workers. A plan lacking age-
related costs and not reducing benefits for older workers has no differ-
ential treatment and therefore does not violate section 4(a). The regula-
tions' subterfuge test would guarantee results consistent with the pur-
poses of section 4(0(2) and the ADEA, regardless of the interpretation
of "employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan."
It may be argued that the definition of "subterfuge" should include a subjec-
tive intent component. Analysis of this idea is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that the definition of subterfuge contained in
the regulations is the proper definition.
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The next question is whether the "such as" clause further subdi-
vides "employee benefit plan." If it does, two tests are necessary. Pre-
sumably, a single test is preferable if the results are not altered. Be-
cause the subterfuge test ensures that a single test will produce results
consistent with the purpose of section 4(f)(2), and because the legisla-
tive history offers no contrary indication, the "such as" clause should
not be interpreted as a limitation. As has been shown, there is ample
authority for this interpretation of the "such as" language.13 2 Conse-
quently, only a test for "employee benefit plan" is needed. The test
selected should reflect better the common understanding of this phrase
and should avoid the inconsistencies of the Westinghouse I test.
The solution proposed here is the adoption of the ERISA defini-
tion of "employee benefit plan,"1 as did the district court in Westing-
house IL"' ERISA is the comprehensive federal statute regulating pen-
sions and employee benefits.13 5 Arguably, it is the "place to fight [the
pension] battle" to which Senator Javits said the ADEA should de-
fer.1 36 If the results of the cases remain unchanged, a definition of "em-
ployee benefit plan" that is consistent with ERISA's definition is pref-
erable. A court adopting this definition could argue that the ADEA and
ERISA share the goal of ensuring solvency in employee benefit plans
and are therefore in pari materia 13 7 Alternatively, it could posit that it
is merely adopting the "plain meaning" of "employee benefit plan" and
that ERISA is the proper place to find this meaning.
ERISA separates employee benefit plans into welfare benefit plans
and pension benefit plans.138 In general, pension benefit plans are those
132 See supra notes 67, 71, 77-79 and accompanying text; see also Cipriano v.
Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1986); Patterson v. Independent School Dist.,
742 F.2d 465, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1984).
133 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1982).
is' See 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (D.N.J. 1982). At the time the current ADEA
regulations were promulgated, it was suggested that § 4(0(2) adopt the ERISA defini-
tion of employee benefit plan. See Amendment to Interpretive Bulletin, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,650 (1979). The suggestion was rejected because the ERISA definition "encom-
passe[d] plans which are maintained to provide vacation benefits, prepaid legal services
and certain other benefits whose cost does not increase with the age of the employee
participant." Id. A court owes limited deference to interpretive regulations issued by an
administrative agency. See General Elec.v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (citing
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); Note, The Effect of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Employee Benefit Plan Exception on Small Busi-
nesses, 13 U.G. DAVIS L. REV. 969, 994-95 & nn.148-49 (1980).
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(1976) (ERISA was the "first comprehensive non-tax regulation of 'employee benefit
plans' under the labor laws.").
136 See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 24. Senator Javits was a cosponsor of
ERISA.
137 N. SINGER, supra note 25, § 51.03.
138 ERISA defines "employee benefit plan" as "an employee welfare benefit plan
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that provide post-employment income.1 39 Welfare benefit plans supply
health benefits and "benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disabil-
ity, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits . . . or prepaid legal
services" to employees or retirees.1 40 To be either a pension or welfare
benefit plan, the arrangement must be a "plan, fund, or program."141
The seminal case defining these terms, Donovan v. Dillingham,"
42
noted, "At a minimum, . . . a 'plan, fund, or program' under ERISA
implies the existence of intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a
source of financing, and a procedure to apply for and collect bene-
fits." 4" The ERISA interpretation gives broad scope to "employee ben-
efit plan" and avoids the inconsistencies of Westinghouse I because it
encompasses all retirement, pension, and insurance plans. By statutory
definition, defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans are
employee benefit plans under ERISA.1 4 ' Courts also include retire-
ment, 45 disability,' 46 insurance,'47 prescription, 48 layoff, 49 and sever-
ance 150 programs within that definition but have refused to extend it to
or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982).
189 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982) (a pension benefit plan is "any plan, fund, or
program which . . .(i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment or beyond").
140 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
141 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2) (1982).
142 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
148 Id. at 1372.
144 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34), (35) (1982).
145 See, e.g., Sreckovic v. International Harvester Co., 601 F. Supp. 332, 334
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (dictum stating that retirement plan included in definition of employee
benefit plan); Commercial Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp.
510, 515 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (profit-sharing retirement plan included in definition of
employee benefit plan).
146 See, e.g., Roe v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir.
1983) (permanent and total disability plan covered by ERISA); Hayden v. Texas-
United States Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 382, 384-85 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (same).
147 See, e.g., Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213-14 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981) (entire life insurance plan within coverage of
ERISA); Nolan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(group accident and health insurance policy regulated by ERISA).
148 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc., 567 F. Supp.
1258, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (prescription plan "part and parcel of ERISA 'employee
benefit plans' ").
149 See, e.g., McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1499
(D.N.J. 1985); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (D.N.J. 1982) (layoff
income and benefit plan is a "welfare plan" within the terms of ERISA).
150 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1985),
affld, 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502-04 (9th
Cir. 1985) (severance pay policy is "welfare plan" under ERISA).
Cases holding severance pay to be an employee welfare benefit plan have relied on
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include accumulated sick pay programs.1"1
Under these decisions, the LIB of Westinghouse I, the severance
pay of Borden's, and the retirement programs of Brennan would be
employee benefit plans. Because none of these three programs have
age-related costs, however, the differential treatment of older workers
under these programs would be subterfuges under the ADEA regula-
tions. Consequently, none of them independently is protected by section
4(f)(2).1 2 This result effectuates the purpose of section 4(0(2) by limit-
ing its protection to differential treatment under plans with inherent
age-related cost factors. Regardless of the program claiming to be an
"employee benefit plan," only those with age-related funding factors
will satisfy the subterfuge test.
Because of the subterfuge test, the Westinghouse I test adds noth-
ing to the statutory interpretation and should be rejected. In every situ-
ation where the Westinghouse I test would classify a plan as outside
section 4(0(2), the plan is also a subterfuge. The proposed test for
"employee benefit plan" avoids the inconsistencies of the Westinghouse
I test and, when combined with the subterfuge test, produces results
consistent with the purpose of section 4(0(2).
IV. INTEGRATED BENEFIT PLANS
Because any plan without age-related funding is a subterfuge and
is easily identified, the test proposed above, if adopted, should reduce
the number of litigated claims arguing that section 4(0(2) indepen-
dently protects a benefit program. Even if a litigant claims independent
protection for a plan, a court can easily decide at the summary judg-
two alternative theories: (1) severance pay is an "unemployment" benefit within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) or (B) (1982), see, e.g., Gilbert, 765 F.2d at 325;
Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985) (severance pay is an
unemployment benefit within § 1002(1)(A)); or (2) regulation 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
(1)(a)(3) (1986) specifically brings severance pay into the definition of employee wel-
fare benefit plans, see, e.g., Gilbert, 765 F.2d at 325; Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748
F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (regulation 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-(1)(a)(3) (1986) "in-
clude[s] within the definition of 'welfare plan' those plans which provide holiday and
severance benefits").
151 See Abella v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 740 F.2d 4, 5 (1984) ("De-
partment of Labor regulations expressly declare that sick leave benefits are excluded
from the definition of 'employee welfare benefit plan.' ").
152 The actions might be protected by another part of the ADEA or as part of an
integrated benefit scheme. In addition to holding that § 4(0(2) applied, the district
court in EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1044 (D.N.J. 1982),
rev'd, 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984), stated that the
LIB did not violate the ADEA because the dmployee made the decision not to receive
the lump sum payment or, alternatively, because the denial relied on reasonable factors
other than age.
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ment stage whether the claim is valid.'5M Nevertheless, much uncer-
tainty still exists as to whether a plan is part of an integrated benefit
scheme. Because most employers provide more than one kind of bene-
fit, 154 the integration debate should become a primary battlefield for
age discrimination claims involving employee benefits. A comprehensive
analysis of whether integration claims are consistent with the purposes
of section 4(f)(2) is beyond the scope of this Comment,1 5  but this Part
proposes several considerations that should be relevant to deciding
whether an integrated benefit scheme exists. The application of these
proposed criteria is demonstrated by using them to evaluate EEOC v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.'15 ("Westinghouse r') and EEOC v. Bor-
den's, Inc.
157
One important consideration should be the presence of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining units frequently negotiate for a pack-
age of benefits and salary. Trade-offs are inherent in this process.,58
153 The court needs only look to the funding structure of the plan to decide if it is
a subterfuge. This structure should rarely be in dispute, so summary judgment will be
appropriate if there is no age-related cost factor.
'" See, e.g., Distribution and Economics of Employer-Provided Fringe Benefits:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 135 (1984)
(1982 United States Chamber of Commerce survey showing that 99% of the companies
surveyed offered health or death benefits, 83% offered pension plans, and 50% offered
long-term disability or salary continuation).
155 One possible explanation might be that formulating an integrated benefit
scheme involves concessions and trade-offs that create a barrier to age discrimination. If
this were the rationale for the different treatment of integrated benefits, one inquiry by
a reviewing court should be the extent to which the negotiation of the benefit scheme
involved good faith bargaining by both sides. Presumably, good faith bargaining would
militate against interpreting a discriminatory provision as discriminatory "because of
age.")
156 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
167 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984). Westinghouse Electric Corporation's integra-
tion claim in the appeal of EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343
(E.D. Pa. 1986), appeal pending, No. 86-1226 (3d Cir.) ("Westinghouse I'), relies
on,several of the proposed factors. See Brief of Appellant at 19-20, Westinghouse II:
That the Westinghouse plans are integrated is clear not only from the
words of these plans, but also from their contemporaneous evolution. For
over 25 years, Westinghouse and its unions have negotiated concurrently
the terms and conditions under which employees become eligible to receive
one immediate post-employment benefit-either immediate pension bene-
fits or LIB-at the time of the termination; they have negotiated these
benefits every three years within the context of one economic bargaining
package . . . . These [factors, along with others,1 point to one conclusion:
that the Westinghouse plans do more than simply "interact"-they form a
part of a comprehensive and integrated post-employment benefits
program.
158 Congress, in enacting a delay provision for the 1978 amendments to the-
ADEA, recognized the importance of trade-offs to collective bargaining. The amend-
ments raised the maximum age covered by the statute to 70 and outlawed mandatory
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For example, the union may be willing to accept a lower amount of
severance pay benefits in exchange for higher salaries or better health
insurance. These decisions depend on the composition of the bargaining
unit "9 and its perception of the employer's financial health. If the pros-
pect of a plant closing is strong, the unit may push for generous sever-
ance or LIB benefits. If the unit has a large number of young workers,
it may be more interested in maternity or paternity leaves and family
health insurance than in retirement or pension benefits. Whatever the
outcome, the benefits generated by the collective bargaining process are
interrelated because of the trade-offs that are inherent in the quid pro
quo in bargaining. A plan generated outside the general collective bar-
gaining agreement will not have as strong a claim of integration as one
enacted concurrently with other terms of employment because in the
former situation, meaningful trade-offs are difficult.1 6 The Westing-
house I district court, in finding the pension plan and the LIB plans to
be integrated, adverted to the importance of collective bargaining in as-
sessing an integration claim, including the traditional deference given to
these agreements. 1
Another necessary consideration for evaluating claims of integra-
tion is the length of time the program has existed. The presence of
collective bargaining cannot be determinative by itself of the existence
of an integrated benefit arrangement because nominal bargaining actu-
ally may be thinly veiled unilateral action by the employer. An em-
ployer may announce a plant closing and shortly thereafter enter into
what is nominally a collectively bargained severance pay agreement
retirement. Many existing contracts called for mandatory retirement at age 65 (the
former maximum statutory age). Congress delayed the effective date of the amendments
"to recognize, and provide the maximum deference to, [collectively bargained] contracts
... [because] these contracts were negotiated in good faith and ... reciprocal agree-
ments and concessions were made." S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 504, 514.
"' See King, The ADEA and Employee Benefit Plans-Part II, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J.
29, 39 (1984) ("The extent to which a substantial percentage of the membership [of a
collective bargaining unit] is ... older or younger will influence how much of the total
wage package will be allocated to improve retirement benefits.").
160 See EEOC v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 618 F. Supp. 115, 122 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (Because severance and pension plans were adopted at different times and were
documented separately, "the severance pay plan was not part and parcel of a total,
integrated benefit package.").
261 EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1041 (D.N.J. 1982),
rev'd, 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). The district
court found the pension plan and the LIB plan to be "interlocked." Id. It emphasized
that the LIB program was part of the pension and insurance agreement, "a collectively
bargained agreement entered into . . . at the same time as and collateral to the main
collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1039. It deserved the "deference due to such
agreements in the interests of labor peace, the polestar of federal labor law." Id. at
1035.
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that excludes pension-eligible employees from receiving severance
pay. 2 Under these conditions, the employees, although given the op-
portunity to bargain, may have almost no bargaining power.", 3 Ineffec-
tive collective bargaining also can occur because of collusion between
the labor organization and the employer. In that situation, there may
be a cause of action against the labor organization under the ADEA 1"
and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").1 6 5 One court has
suggested that when bargaining power is unfairly one-sided, the result-
ing plan is not "bona fide." '
Borden's, in which two unions accepted identical severance agree-
ments within a few months of the announced plant closing, presents a
pointed example of a last-minute severance pay plan. In contrast, the
Westinghouse I LIB program had been in the collective bargaining
agreement for almost twenty years before the plant closings.16 7 Under
those circumstances, it is difficult to characterize the LIB program as
unilaterally imposed. A long-standing, collectively bargained program
should raise a strong presumption of integration.
Specificity of the program is another important consideration. If
an employer has a company-wide collective bargaining agreement, but
certain programs apply only to specific facilities, integration of these
programs could be considered absent. Again, Borden's and Westing-
house I provide a contrast. The LIB program applied to Westinghouse
116 After announcing a plant closing, an employer must engage in bargaining over
the effects of the closing in "a meaningful manner ... at a meaningful time." First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981). One result of this "ef-
fects bargaining" may be a severance pay plan. For a comprehensive discussion of em-
ployer bargaining duties incident to a plant closing, see P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB
AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: PLANT CLOSINGS, RELOCATIONS, SUBCONTRACT-
ING, AND AUTOMATION 133-66 (1983).
I's But see P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 162, at 159-60. One purpose of requiring
effects bargaining incident to a plant closing is to ensure that bargaining takes place
when the union's collective bargaining strength has not dissipated.
1" See 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1982) (labor organization prohibited from discrimi-
nating on the basis of age).
165 Collusive bargaining may violate the union's duty of fair representation. See
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (labor union cannot refuse to re-
present all in craft); see also Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944), reh'g
denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945) ("By its selection as bargaining representative, [the union]
has become the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of represent-
ing their interests fairly and impartially."); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 698-701 (1976) (A union's violation of
the duty of fair representation may violate §§ 8(b)(1), (2), (3) of the NLRA.).
1" EEOC v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 618 F. Supp. 115, 122 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
167 The LIB plan was added in 1960. Brief for Appellant at 5, EEOC v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1986), appeal pending, No. 86-
1226 (3d Cir.) ("Westinghouse IF'). The plant closing occurred in 1977. See Westing-
house 1, 725 F.2d at 214.
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facilities nationwide. The Borden's severance pay program only ap-
plied to the specific facilities being closed.
A final criterion, considered relevant by the Seventh Circuit in its
decision in EEOC v. Fox Point-Bayside School District,118 is the expec-
tation of the prospective employee. The school district mandatorily re-
tired a sixty-five-year-old teacher pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement. 6' The retirement plan consisted of two components: the lo-
cal collective bargaining agreement and the Wisconsin State Teachers
Retirement System ("STRS"), a defined contribution plan providing
retirement and disability benefits.170 A state statute established the
STRS as the primary retirement plan but local collective agreements
supplemented it.171 The disputed issue was whether the collective
agreement and STRS merged into an integrated benefit plan.
The Seventh Circuit held that the individual components joined to
create a single retirement plan. 17 The court said that the mandatory
retirement provision of the collective agreement was "by its very nature
central to a retirement plan. A prospective teacher considering offers of
employment from two school districts certainly would not consider such
a provision peripheral to an evaluation of the retirement plans offered
by the two districts. '17' The court distinguished Westinghouse I, Bor-
den's, and Alford v. City of Lubbock17' on their facts, stating that those
"cases do not hold that a mandatory retirement provision is separate
from a retirement plan, and the reasoning [those cases] employ does not
-help in analyzing that question. 178
None of the proposed criteria independently should resolve the
question of integration of benefit plans. This determination will depend
on the facts of each case and the weight given to each criterion by the
deciding court. Nevertheless, they provide a starting point for judicial
evaluation of integration claims under section 4(0(2). Applying them to
Westinghouse I shows the LIB program to be integrated with the over-
all benefit arrangement because it was negotiated as part of the nation-
wide collective bargaining agreement and existed for many years prior
to the plant closing. In Borden's, however, the severance pay plan
16 772 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1985).
19 See id. at 1298. The collective agreement called for mandatory retirement at
age 65. The delay provision of the 1978 ADEA amendments rendered them inapplica-
ble. Id. at 1299.
170 See id. at 1300. The STRS was a contributory plan. See supra notes 122, 125-
27 and accompanying text.
271 772 F.2d at 1300.
172 Id. at 1301.
178 Id.
174 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
176 Id. at 1302.
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should not be afforded protection by section 4(0(2): the plan was nego-
tiated independently from the other terms of the collective agreement,
just prior to the plant closing and only applied to the plants being
closed.
After a court determines that an integrated benefit scheme exists,
it must test the integrated plan under the ADEA. The recent decision
in EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 176 was the first case to find
explicitly an integrated plan under section 4(f)(2) and to test that plan
under the Act. 177 Firestone, pursuant to its severance pay plan, did not
pay benefits to employees eligible for retirement at the time of a plant
closing. In the subsequent age discrimination suit, the court found that
the severance pay was "part of a coordinated pension scheme" that was
a bona fide pension plan within section 4(f)(2).78 Primary to this con-
clusion was the court's finding that the severance pay award was a
minimum pension benefit, not a full lay-off benefit.179 The court also
relied on the fact that the severance pay plan had been "part of [Fire-
stone's] pension plan since 1955, ha[d] been included in the plant clo-
sure provision since 1976, ha[d] been bargained for and is contained in
the same document" as is the pension plan. 80 Having determined that
an integrated pension plan existed, the court found that under this total
plan older workers received "greater overall benefits than younger em-
ployees and that there was no adverse treatment." ' 1 The integrated
plan, therefore, did not violate section 4(a).
CONCLUSION
With the growing concern for the cost of employee benefits, em-
ployers may increasingly attempt to provide fewer benefits for older
workers. In addition, many collective bargaining agreements contain
long-standing provisions denying severance or supplemental unemploy-
ment benefits to pension eligible employees 82 generally negotiated to
maximize payments to individuals who are without other immediate
sources of income.18 These situations are certain to lead to litigation
under section 4(0(2) of the ADEA, but it must be remembered that, in
176 650 F. Supp. 1561 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
S177Although Fox-Point found an integrated plan, the Seventh Circuit merely re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment. See 772 F.2d at 1303.
178 Firestone, 650 F. Supp. at 1569.
279 Id. at 1567.
180 Id. at 1568.
181 Id. at 1569.
189 See, e.g., id. at 1563.
18 See Brief for Appellant at 7-10, EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1986) No. 86-1226 ("Westinghouse I').
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the context of independent programs, section 4(0(2) provides a narrow
and specific protection.
The Westinghouse I test provides results that conflict with the
terms of the statute and with the legislative history. A careful examina-
tion of the statute and the regulations shows that the subterfuge clause,
as interpreted in the regulations, limits the need for a vigorous test for
"employee benefit plan." Adoption of the ERISA definitions would
preclude the problems of Westinghouse I and would harmonize the def-
initions under ERISA and ADEA. The proposed interpretation of sec-
tion 4(0(2) adopts the regulations' objective test for determining
whether an independent plan is a subterfuge and should reduce the
amount of litigation over independent plans. The proposed test would
also better enable employers and employees to estimate the possibility
of successful litigation and to make appropriate decisions about
settlement.
The issue of integrated benefit plans remains unsettled. The pres-
ence of effective collective bargaining, the length of existence of the pro-
gram, the specificity of the program, and the impressions of a prospec-
tive employee are all relevant considerations in assessing a claim of
integration. Section 4(0(2) is certain to be a battleground for future
cases. This Comment proposes an easily applied test for independent
"employee benefit plans" under section 4(0(2) that avoids the problems
of the current interpretations and suggests a starting point for evaluat-
ing whether an integrated benefit scheme exists.
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